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1 Introduction 
This paper studies a model of sequential trade for goods and assets in which all 
relevant information is symmetric across economic agents and trade takes place 
sequentially over time. A model of sequential markets is a system of reopening spot 
markets which are linked via a system of financial markets. The use of financial 
instruments allows each agent to redistribute income across the dates. 
The first general model of sequential market was provided by Radner (-1972). He 
showed the existence of equilibria in a general equilibrium model under uncertainty 
in a sequence of incomplete markets at successive dates. He assumed that agents 
forecast correctly their future environment. With perfect foresight, it is known that 
the Radner model is equivalent to the Arrow-Debreu model (see Arrow and Hahn 
(1971) and Debreu (1959)). However, in reality there are asset markets that transfer 
wealth across the states of the world that will revealed in the future. In other words, 
none of these markets is complete in Arrow-Debreu sense. 
This model has evolved into the model of general equilibrium with incomplete 
markets (GEl). Surveys in this area are due to eass (1990), Duffle (1990), Geanako-
plos (1990), Magill and Shafer (1991) and Magill and Quinzii (1996), Hens (199S). 
The purpose of this paper is the development of a general approach to existence 
problems in GEl models assuming that firms maximize a general objective, and an 
appropriate algorithm for the computation of equilibria in large-scale GEl models. 
The description of firms in incomplete markets is still unsatisfactory. For a survey 
of alternative objective functions of the firm see Duffle (1992). We consider that 
firms maximize a general objective subject to their balance equations. In reality, the 
objectives of the firm emerge from the objectives of those individuals who control 
it. For instance, a firm could consider maximizing the conditional expected profit, 
or a firm could be interested in the maximization of the minimum profit because of 
aversion risk, or the size of firm's labor force (for example, a cooperative). Hence, it 
is crucial to develop a general equilibrium theory that allows different decision rules. 
On the other hand, the balance equations plays a essential role in the theory of 
accounting. Then, it is really important to incorporate these effects into the firms' 
problem. 
We present a constructive proof of existence of equilibria based on mathematical 
programming techniques. The convexity assumptions are crucial for the arguments 
used in this proof. However, in the real world we can observe the presence of 
non-convexities. For example, non-convexities in production can arise from indivis-
ibilities, setup costs (the production sets do not include the origin) or (locally or 
globally) non-convex technologies (increasing returns of scale). Non-convexities in 
consumption can arise from indivisibilities or non-concave utility functions. On the 
other hand, we also assumes implicitly lower bounds on short sales. The limited 
short-selling assumption implies that agents cannot hold asset's portfolios of arbi-
trarily size. This condition was also assumed by Radner (1972, 19S2). However, such 
a condition is necessary to ensure the existence of equilibria (Hart (1975) first proved 
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that equilibria may fail to exist without bounds on short sales by a counter-example), 
it was considered unrealistic. If convexity or limited short-selling assumptions are 
relaxed, a sequential equilibrium may fail to exist due to discontinuities in the excess 
demand correspondence. 
Approaches based on the excess demand equations were developed to overcome 
the problems caused by the unlimited short-selling assumption and so to prove the 
existence of equilibria for a generic set of economies. For example, Duffie and Shafer 
(1985) used algebraic and differential topology (in particular, the Grassmanian man-
ifold) and Brown et al. (1996b) introduced an auxiliary asset. The main inconve-
nience of these approaches is a substantial increase in mathematical complexity. 
We provide a characterization of sequential equilibria relaxing the limited short-
selling and the standard convexity assumptions. Our characterization only requires 
to satisfy these restrictive assumptions in the neighbourhood of the solution point. 
The chief idea is to be locally optimal. Therefore, we first introduce a definition for 
what we call a local equilibrium. Then, instead of determining an equilibrium as a 
solution of the market excess demand function, we provide an alternative system of 
equations that can be solved to find equilibria. This system is very useful in practice 
since we avoid to compute the excess demand function that is difficult to obtain in 
large applied models. 
We also develop an appropriate algorithm for the computation of equilibria in 
large-scale sequential models. Much recent work on the computation of sequential 
equilibria has been based on the path following or homotopy methods. There are 
three main approaches to compute equilibria in the GEl model. The main idea of 
these approaches is the use of the equivalent definition of an equilibrium known as 
no-arbitmge equilibrium given by Cass (1984). 
The first method was given by DeMarzo and Eaves (1996). They consider the ex-
cess demand function defined on prices and elements of the Grassmannian manifold 
(see e.g. Duffie and Shafer (1985)). By applying the work of Brown et al. (1996a), 
they computed equilibria via homotopy algorithm. The second and alternative al-
gorithm for computing fixed points was developed by Brown et al. (1996b). They 
consider the excess demand function as a function of just prices. Since this excess 
demand function is discontinuous, they introduce an auxiliary asset to define a fam-
ily of homotopies. The third approach is due to Schmedders (1998). He computed 
equilibria with homotopy techniques using the first-order conditions of the agents' 
problem with penalties for transactions on the asset markets. 
vVe could apply homotopy techniques to compute the equilibrium values but 
these algorithms are less computationally efficient. In order to improve its efficiency, 
we present an alternative algorithm to compute such equilibria via interior point 
methods. 
The rest of the paper is organized in two parts. The first part is devoted to two 
period production models known as the basic GEl model. In section 2 we describe 
the basic model and stress its main properties. Section 3 is devoted to the existence 
of a GEl equilibria in spot-financial markets. In section 4, we characterize the local 
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GEl equilibrium as the solution of a nonlinear system of equations. In section 5, 
we also prove the uniqueness of such equilibria. In section 6, we compute such a 
equilibrium via interior point methods. The second part extends these results of the 
two periods GEl model to multiple periods. 
2 The two period production model 
! 
In order to be as simple as possible, we consider only two period production economies 
to describe economic situations under conditions of uncertainty. Much of the theory 
of incomplete markets is devoted to two period exchange models. We will extend 
the two period production model to multiple periods in Section 7. 
The GEl model describes an economy over two time periods (t = 0,1) with 
uncertainty over the state of nature in period 1. At time t = 0 the economy is 
in state s = 0 which is known by each of the I + J agents (I consumers and 
J firms) participating in the economy (i.e. all relevant information is symmetric 
across economic). But it is not known which of the 5 possible states at time t = 1 
will occur (i.e. trade takes place sequentially over time). 
In each state there are D goods, distinguished by their location and their physical 
characteristics. For each of the goods d = 1, ... , D there exists a spot market in every 
state at spot price Psd. Hence the commodity space is IRD(S+1). For any x E IRD(S+l), 
xT denotes the transpose of x, which is a D (5 + I)-dimensional row vector. For any 
x, y E IRD(S+I), x . y = xT y denotes the inner product of vectors x and y. 
There is a finite number C of assets traded on financial markets at asset prices 
q. Let B, ~ denote the portfolio of traded assets by consumers and producers, respec-
tively. Hence the financial asset space is IRc . The asset Bc can be purchased for the 
price qc at date 0 and delivers a return across the states at date 1 that can be given 
exogenously or it can be a function of the spot market prices. 
The asset structure of an asset c is described by the asset matrix AC = (A~, ... , AS)T 
across the states at date 1, where A~ is the commodity bundle which asset c deliv-
ers at state s. Then the asset c delivers a nominal return Vsc = Ps . A~ in state 
s. Therefore, the assets structure is summarized by the asset matrix (in units of 
commodities): 
(
Ail 
D~C = ~l 
SD 
and by the nominal return matrix: 
V (p)= : 
(
VII (PI) 
SxC Vi (Ps) 
To be general, we consider that asset matrix A (p, q) depends on spot and asset 
prices; i.e. A = A (p, q). 
4 
l 
We assume that S 2: C. The completeness condition is a very important prop-
erty in the context of GEl markets. The financial markets are called complete if 
rank (V (p, q)) = S for any (p, q) prices. In this situation, agents can insure them-
selves against any kind of contingency in period t = 1. When rank (V (p, q)) < S, 
the financial markets are called incomplete. See Magill and Shafer (1991). 
We assume that the markets on which the commodities and the financial assets 
are traded are competitive, so that agents believe that they can buy and sell as 
many commodities or assets as they want without affecting their prices. -
Each consumer is described by his consumption set Xi C IRD (s+1), the set of 
traded assets Z C IRc and its initial endowments of the D (S + 1) goods in each 
state Wi = (WiO, Wi1, ... , WiS) E Xi. Consumers' tastes, their risk attitudes and time 
preferences are described by utility functions Ui : Xi -+ R Thus, consumers face 
the following problem: 
Po . XiO ~ Po . WiO - q. ei, 
Ps . Xis ~ Ps· Wis + Ps . As (p, q) . ei , Vs = 1, ... , S, 
Xi E Xi, ei E Z, 
where As (p, q) is the s - th row of the matrix A (p, q) . 
(1) 
On the other hand, each firm is described by its technology Vj C IRD (S+l), and 
the set of traded assets Z C IRc . To model the behavior of the firm, we consider a 
general objective Dj : Vj x Z x IRD(S+l) x IRc -+ R For example, if the firms seek 
to maximize their expected profits, then the firms' objective is given by 
S 
D(y,~,p,q) = E [P6Yo +P;Ys] - q~ = P6Yo + LPsP;Ys - q~. 
s=l 
For a survey of alternative objective functions of the firm see Duffie (1992). Thus, 
firms face the following problem: 
Aff.X OJ (Yj'~j,p,q) 
Po . YjO + q . ~j = 0 
Ps· Y j s - Ps . As (p, q) . ~ j = 0, Vs = 1, ... , S, 
(2) 
Yj E V j , ~i E Z. 
For all j = 1, ... , J, the equations 
{
PO. YjO + q . ~j = 0, 
Ps . Yjs - Ps . As . ~j = 0, Vs = 1, ... , S, 
are known as balance equations for the J firms. These equations play a crucial role 
in the theory of accounting. Note that if we consider inequalities such as 2: 0 instead 
of equalities, there exist profits that will not be distributed. This has no economic 
interpretation (in equilibrium, the market clearing conditions will not be satisfied 
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at positive prices). We will prove by contradiction. Suppose that, in equilibrium, 
for all j = 1, ... , J, 
{ 
* * + * c* ° Po . YjO q. ~j > ,
P; . yjs - P; . As .~; > 0, Vs = 1, ... , S, 
adding and using the market clearing condition, we have 
J J 
p~. L yjo + q* . L~: * Po' 
j=1 j=1 
J J I 
P:' L yjs - P: . As . L~: - P: . As' Le: > 0, Vs. 
j=1 j=1 i=1 
On the other hand, we have that the GEl equilibrium satisfies the budget con-
straint of each consumer; i.e. for all i = 1, ... , l, 
p~ . (x:o - WiO) + q* . e: < 0, 
P: . (x: - Wi) - P: . As . e: < 0, Vs = 1, ... , S 
that contradicts the previous result. 
A similar problem arises in the context of general Arrow-Debreu equilibrium 
models when we assume that firms are not owned by consumers. 
We now introduce the concept of a GEl equilibrium. 
Definition 1 GEl Equilibrium. The vector prices (p*, q*) E IRD (S+1) x IRe, with 
(p*, q*) i= 0, and the allocation 
I J 
((x*,e*),(y*,C)) Ell (Xi x /Z) xII (Yj x /Z), 
i=1 j=1 
is a GEl equilibrium for the economy E if: 
CP (xi, e:) is an optimal solution to Problem (1) , Vi ----.- 1, ... , l, 
FP (yj, ~;) is an optimal solution to Problem (2) , Vj = 1, ... , J, 
I J I I 
MC Market clearing: 2: xi = 2: yj+ 2: Wi and 2: e: = 2::=1 ~:. 
i=1 j=1 i=1 i=1 
The next step is to introduce the definition of a GEl equilibrium with excess 
demand. This differs from the GEl equilibrium in the market clearing condition. 
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Definition 2 GEl Equilibrium with free disposability. The vector prices (p*, q*) 
E IRD(S+l) x IRe, with (p*, q*) i=- 0, and the allocation 
I J 
((x*, e*), (y*, C)) E IT (Xi X Z) x IT (Yj x Z), 
i=l j=l 
is a CEI equilibrium with free disposal for the economy E if the following hold: (FP), 
(GP), and 
MC' Feasibility: 
I J I 
LX; < Lyj+ LWi, 
i=l j=l i=l 
I J 
Le: Le. 
i=l j=l 
Without loss of generality, we assume that prices (p, q) are defined on 
\vhenever spot prices are assumed to be nonnegative, or, in the general case, prices 
(p, q) are defined on 
Thus, a GEl economy can thus be described by a set 
whose elements satisfy the following conditions: 
H.!. The ith consumer's consumption set Xi c IRD(S+l) is closed and Wi E Xi. 
H.2. The utility function Ui (.) that represents the ith consumer's preference relation 
~ i is continuous. 
H.3. Xi is convex, Vi = 1, ... , I. 
H.4. Ui (.) is concave in Xi, Vi = 1, ... , I. 
H.5. The utility function Ui (-) is strictly monotonous and increasing. 
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H.6. Survival assumption: For every consumer, there exists ;!;.i E Xi such that 
;!;.i « Wi, 
H.7. The production set for the j - th firm, Y j C IRD (s+1), is closed, bounded and 
o E Y j , 
H.8. The objective function for the j - th firm Dj : Y j x Z x IRD (S+1) x IRc -+ IR is 
continuous, 
H.9. Y j is convex, Vj = 1, .. " 1. 
H.lD. Dj (Yj, ~j'P' q) is concave in Y j and Z, V (p, q) E IRD(S+l) x IRc, Vj = 1, .. " 1. 
H.l1. Dj (Yj'~j,p,q) is homogeneous of degree a in (p,q) for some a > 0, Vj = 
1, .. " J, 
H.12. The set of feasible financial assets Z C IRc is closed, bounded and 0 E Z, 
H.13. Z c IRc is convex, 
H.14. The return functions As (p, q) are nonnegative, continuous, and homogeneous 
of degree zero in (p, q) , 
H.15. Financial asset survival assumption: For all (p, q) E IRD (S+1) x IRc , :3 0 E 
Z such that As (p, q) 0 » 0 (this assumption ensures that consumers will never 
be satiated in their asset demand), 
H.16. The set of feasible allocations 
is nonempty, closed, and bounded, 
H.17. For each (p, q) E 6+, the set 
IF(p,q)= {(x,O) EI1 (Xi x Z): :3(y,~) E (fl(p,q),Z(p,q)) , ((x,O),(y,~)) EA, 
Ps ' Xis ~ Ps ' Wis + Ps ' As (p, q) ,Oi, Vs = 1, .. " S, Vi = 1, .. " I} 
J ~ J ~ 
is nonempty, where y(p, q) = L Yj (p, q) and ~ (p, q) = L ~j (p, q) are defined 
as 
j=l j=l 
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{Dj (Yj'~j'P' q) : PO' YjO + q, ~j = 0 
Ps ' Yjs - Ps ' As (p, q) , ~i = 0, Vs} 
We have considered the assumptions on the characteristics of the economy under 
which the general equilibrium model works. Most of them are standard in the theory 
of incomplete markets except Assumptions (H.12) , (H.14) and (H.17). 
Assumption (H.12) , known as the limited short-selling assumption, is not too 
restrictive condition. Note that if the consumption sets Xi and the production sets 
1{ j are assumed to be bounded, we have implicitly assumed lower bounds on short 
sales. 
The limited short-selling assumption implies that agents cannot hold asset's port-
folios of arbitrarily size. This condition was also assumed by Radner (1972, 1982). 
However, such a condition is necessary to ensure the existence of equilibria (Hart 
(1975) first proved that equilibria may fail to exist without bounds on short sales 
by a counter-example), it was considered unrealistic. Nevertheless, there exist ex-
ogenous reasons to assume that assets are bounded. In the real world, there is 
a limitation on the number of financial contracts that can be traded by financial 
markets or financial intermediaries. The number of brokers or agents that make 
contractual commitments is finite and moreover, there is a limitation on the number 
of operations to buy-sell. In other words, there exist technological constraints that 
prevent agents from holding an arbitrarily large number of asset's portfolios. As a 
consequence, from the economic point of view, it seen reasonable to assume that 
Z is bounded. For example, we can consider a number l large enough such that 
Ileill ~ l, II~J ~ l. 
Assumption (H.14) cannot be applied to some particular set of assets as options. 
Our basic tool to prove the existence of GEl equilibria, and consequently, to 
characterize GEl equilibria is to consider a mathematical program. Assumption 
(H.17) assure that this program will have a solution and cannot be relaxed. If the 
set IF (p, q) is empty for some (p, q) E .6.+, the excess demand correspondence would 
be empty for such (p, q) and, consequently, there may exist no equilibria. 
Now we states sufficient conditions under which a GEl equilibrium exists. 
3 Existence of a two-period GEl equilibrium 
The purpose of this section is to establish the existence of a two-period GEl equi-
librium. First we prove the existence of an equilibrium with (p*, q*) E .6.+; i.e. with 
nonnegative spot prices, p* 2': O. Then, we prove the existence of an equilibrium with 
(p*, q*) E .6.; i.e. with non zero spot prices, p* =I=- O. 
Theorem 3 Existence of a GEl equilibrium. Let E be an economy satisfying 
conditions (H.1) to (H.17). Then there exists a GEl equilibrium. 
Proof. 
The proof will be decomposed into 6 parts. 
Step 0: 
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For all (p, q) E 6.+, let define the set of feasible production as 
Trivially, this set is a nonempty (since 0 E Yj (p, q)) and compact set for all (p, q) E 
6.+. Then, for all j = 1, ... , J, the solutions (Yj (p, q) ,Zj (p, q)) of the firms' problem 
Max 
s.t. 
OJ (Yj'~j,p,q) 
Po . YjO + q . ~j = 0 
Ps . Yjs - Ps . As (p, q) . ~j = 0, Vs 
Yjs E Y js , ~j E Z, 
are non-empty, compact-valued, convex-valued, usc correspondences on Yj (p, q) , for 
all (p, q) E 6.+. by applying the Maximum Theorem under convexity. Note that 
(Yj (p, q), Zj (p, q)) are homogeneous of degree zero by Assumption (H.ll) and 
(H.14) , and are well-defined at (p, q) = o. 
On the other hand, let consider the set 
Trivially, this set is a nonempty and compact. 
Now, consider (p, q) E 6.+, (y,~) E Y and 6 E Ao such that define the following 
problem, 
I 
Max 2:: 6i Ui (XiO, ... ,XiS) 
S.t. i=l 
I I J ~ 2:: XiO :::;2:: WiO + 2:: j=l YjO (p, q) , i=l i=l 
I ~ I I 
2:: Xis + 2::1=1 As (p, q) ~j (p, q) :::;2:: Wis + 2::1=1 Yjs (p, q) + 2:: As (p, q) . ()i, Vs = I, ... , S, 
i=l i=l i=l 
I J ~ 
2:: ()i = 2:: j =l ~j (p, q) , i=l 
Ps . Xis:::; Ps . Wis + Ps· As . ()i, Vs = I, ... , S, Vi = I, ... , J, 
Xi E Xi, ()i E Z. 
(3) 
Note also that the Slater's constraint qualification is satisfied since the constraints 
of Problem (3) are linear in X and (). 
To prove the existence of a equilibrium, we first prove that a solution (x, e,:\,~) 
of Problem (3) exists. In step Il, we show that (x, e, Y'~':\'~) could be a GEl 
equilibrium with free disposability, under certain conditions with 6 » O. In step 
Ill, we prove the existence of (6*, x*, ()*, y*, C, p*, q*) that satisfies the conditions 
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required in step Il, by means of a fixed point theorem. Finally, we verify that 
(x*, e*, y*, C, p*, q*) also satisfies the market clearing conditions and 8* » 0. 
Step I: 
Note that IF (p, q) is a compact set by Assumption (H.16) . By Weierstrass' the-
orem, for each (p, q) E ~+, (y,~) E Y and 8 E A, we can guarantee the existence of 
a solution for Problem (3). Let us denote this solution as 
I 
(x(8,p,q,y,~),e(8,p,q,y,~)) Err (Xi x Z). 
Note that these correspondences are nonempty. 
Step II: 
i=l 
Given the primal Problem (3), define the Lagrangian function 
<I> (x, e, A,,p, "I) ~ t 6i Ui (XiO, "', XiS) + AO' (t WiO + t YjO- t XiO) + 
+ t A,' (t Wi, + t y;,+ t A, (p,q)' ei- t Xi' - tA, (P,q}~j) 
+1>. (t~j- t Oi) + tt 'Yi,P,' (Wi' + A,· ei - Xi,) 
By Lagrange's duality theorem l , for all (x,e) solution of Problem (3), there 
exist>': = >':(8,p,q,y,~) ?: 0, ~ = ~(8,p,q,y,~) -=1= 0, 9(8,p,q,y,~) -=1= 0, with 
( >.: ~ ::v) E jRD(S+l) x IRc x IRIS such that· ,,/-,, I + +, . 
1. 
<I>((x,e),>':,~,9) = max{<I>((x,e)'>':,~,9) : (x,e) Ett (XiX Z)} (4) 
2. 
(5) 
lSee Avriel (1976), Th. 4.41, pp 99-100, Bertsekas (1995), Prop. 5.1.5,5.1.6, pp. 427-428 and 
Bazaraa et al (1979), Th. 6.2.5, pp 209-210. 
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Note that in view of the Assumption (H.5), it follows that :x =1= 0, hence (:x,~) =1= 
0, and 9 =1= 0. Let us denote by :X(8,p,q,y,~), ~(8,p,q,y,~), 9(8,p,q,y,O the 
nonempty convex set of all admissible :x, ~, 9 respectively. 
Then, by these optimality conditions, we can show that ((x, 0) , (y,~) ,:x,~) is 
a candidate to be a GEl equilibrium: 
a) By Condition 2 in Lagrange theorem (eq. (5)), ((x,O) ,(y,~),:X, ~l satisfies 
the feasibility condition of a GEl equilibrium with free disposability: 
Vs = 1, ... , S, 
Vs = 1, ... ,S, 
b)Let now study i' - th consumer's problem. Taking Vi =1= i', Xi = Xi, ei = ei 
from (4) , it follows that 
S 
l5il Ui
' 
(XiIO, ... , XiIS) + :Xo . (WiIO - XiIO) - ~ . Oil + L :Xs . (WiIS + As (p, q) . Oi' - XiIS) 
s=l 
S 
+ L 9ils Ps· (WiIS + As (p,q). Oil - XiIS) 
s=l 
S 
> l5il Ui
' 
(XiIO, ... ,XiIS) +:Xo· (WiIO - XiIO) - ~. ei,+ L:Xs· (Wils + As (p,q). ei, - Xils) 
s=l 
S 
+ L 9ils Ps . (Wils + As (p, q) . ei, - Xils) , 
s=l 
that, equivalently, 
8i , Ui' (XiIO, ... , Xii S) + :Xo . (WiIO - XiIO) - ~ . Oi' 
S 
+ L (:Xs + 9iISPS) . (WiIS + As (p, q) . Oi' - XiIS) 
s=l 
> l5il Ui
' 
(XiIO, ... , XiIS) +:Xo . (WiIO - XiIO) - ~. ei, 
S 
+ L (:xs + 9iISPS) . (Wils + As (p, q) . ei, - Xils). 
s=l 
\Ve will distinguish two cases according to the positivity of l5i ,. 
12 
I 
i 
I 
I 
-Whenever l5i , = 0, 
s 
:\0 . (WiIO - XiIO) - ~ . Oi' + L (:\s + 1iISPS) . (WiIS + As (p, q) . Oil - XiIS) 2:: 
s=l 
S 
:\0· (WiIO - XiIO) - ~. ei,+ L (:\s + 1iISPS) . (Wils + As (p, q) . eil - Xils), \f (Xii, eil). 
s=l --
By Condition 2 in Lagrange theorem (eq. (5)), we have 
s 
:\0 . (WiIO - XiIO) - ~ . Oi' + L :\s . (WiIS + As (p, q) . Oil - XiIS) 2:: 
s=l 
S 
:\O·(WiIO-XiIO)-~·eil+ L (:\S+1iISPS) . (Wils+ As(p,q)·eil-xils), \f(Xil,eil). 
s=l 
Let define the transfers of the i - th consumers as 
S 
ti = :\0 . (XiO - WiO) + ~ . Oi+ L :\s . (XiS - As (p, q) .Oi - WiS) . 
s=l 
Taking ei, = 0, we have 
S 
ti' :::; :\0 . (XiIO - WiIO) + L (:\s + 1iISPS) . (Xils - WiIS) , \fXi
'
· 
s=l 
\Vhenever it is satisfied 
,ye have 
S 
ti' :::; :\0 . (XiIO - WiIO) + L (1 + 1is / (11 (:\,~) 11)) :\s· (Xils - WiIS) , \fXi' · 
s=l 
with (1 + 1is / (11 (:\,~) 11) ) 2:: o. 
By Assumption (H.6) (:3J:il E Xii such that J:i' « Wi l ), we have 
S 
ti' :::; :\0· (J:iIO - WiIO) + L (1 + 1is / (11 (:\,~) 11)) :\s· (J:ils - Wils) < O. 
s=l 
~ 
whenever ,\ i=- o. 
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We will see in step IV, we will show that 8; » 0, by contradiction with this part. 
In step V, we also will prove that in equilibrium :\ i=- 0. 
-Whenever 8i , i=- 0, we have 
1~ 
> Ui' (Xi'O, ... , Xi'S) + 8
i
, Ao . (Wi'O - Xi'O) -
1 ~ S (:\s + 1i'SPS) 
T.;ct>.ei,+ L 8., . (Wi's+ As(p,q)·ei,-xi's), V(Xi"ei,). 
l s=1 l 
Whenever the condition (6) is satisfied, we have 
for all s = 1, ... , S. Let define 
Note that Vis 2: 0, Vs. 
Then, we have that it is satisfied 
Ui' (Xi'O, ... , Xi'S) + Vi'O:\O . (Wi'O - Xi'O) -
S 
Vi'O~ . ei,+ L Vi's:\s . (Wi'S + As (p, q) . ei, - Xi'S) 
s=1 
> Ui' (Xi'O, ... ,Xi'S) + Vi'O:\O· (Wi'O - Xi'O)-
S 
Vi'O~· ei,+ L Vi'Ss . (Wi's + As (p, q) . ei, - Xi's), V (Xi', ei,) . 
s=1 
By the nonsatiation assumption (H.5) , we have that 1is > 0; hence, 
Ps . ( Wis + As (p, q) . ei - XiS) = 0, Vs = 1, ... , S, Vi. 
~ 
Moreover, whenever A i=- ° and 8i > 0, it is satisfied that 
Vis> 0, Vs = 0,1, ... , S, Vi = 1, ... , I. 
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Then, (Xi', ei,) is a saddle point of the following Lagrangian function 
<Pi' (Xi', ei" Vi') = Ui' (Xi'O, ... , Xi'S) + Vi'O [:\0' (Wi'O - Xi'O) - ~. ei'] + 
S 
+ LVi's [:\s' (Wi's + As (p,q)' ei, - Xi'S)] 
s=l 
and, Vs = 1, ... , S 
And if (Xi' ei) is a saddle point, then ( Xi, ei) is one of the decision plans of the 
i - th consumer; i.e. 
{ Ui (XiO, ... , XiS) : :\0 . XiO ::; :\0 . WiO - ~ . ei, 
:\s . Xis::; :\s . Wis + :\s . As (p, q) . ei, Vs = 1, ... , S} . 
In other words, by homogeneity of matrix As (p, q) , (Xi' ei) is one of the decision 
plans of the i - th consumer whenever it is satisfied (6) and 
:\0' (WiO - XiO) - ~. ei 
:\s . ( Wis + As (p, q) . ei - XiS) 
0, with ViO > 0 
0, with Vis> 0, Vs = 1, ... , S. 
Note that, for all i - th consumer, the equalities 
are satisfied trivially, whenever it is satisfied (6) . 
(7) 
In step Ill, we will see that, in equilibrium, there exists a vector (8*, p*, q*, y*, ~*) 
that satisfies the condition (6) with (p*, q*) -=1= 0,8* »0 and 0 E t i , where 
~ ~ 
ti = Ao . (XiO - WiO) - <p • ei, 
by condition (7) . In step IV, we also will show that 8: »0. Furthermore, in step 
V we will show that (p*, q*) -=1= o. 
Step Ill: 
15 
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Let define 
ti (8,p,q,x,e,y,~) >'o(8,p,q,x,e,y,~). (XiO - WiO) +~(8,p,q,x,e,y,~). ei 
S 
+ 2::= >'s (8,p, q, x, e, y,~) . (Xis - As (p, q) . ei - Wis)' 
s=l 
Since the set of all feasible consumption and production sets are bounded, we may 
construct a compact and convex set K which contains all feasible consumption and 
assets of agent i in its interior, respectively all feasible production plan and assets 
for firm j. 
In view of Assumptions (H.2) and (H.6), we can construct some compact and 
convex sets K 1, K2, K3 and K4 such that for all (8, p, q) E A x .6.+ and all allocation 
(x, e, y,~) E KI X K J , the set 
(>'(8,p,q,x,e,y,~) ,~(8,p,q,x,e,y,~),1(8,p,q,x,e,y,~) ,t(8,p,q,x,e,y,~)) 
is in K1 x K2 X K3 X K4 and K1 C JR.~(S+l) \ {O}, K2 C JR.c \ {O} , K3 C JR.~s \ {O}, 
K4 C {t E JR.I: L{=l ti = o}. . 
Note that these sets 
(>'(8,p,q,x,e,y,~) ,~(8,p,q,x,e,y,~) '1(8,p,q,x,e,y,~),t(8,p,q,x,e,y,~)) 
are possibly empty-valued since (x, e) is not necessarily a solution of the Problem 
(3), in particular (x, e, y,~) is not necessarily feasible. 
We can now define the correspondence 'lj; from the convex and compact set 
A x .6.+ X K1 X K2 X K3 X K4 
I I J J 
X IT (Xi n K) x IT (Z n K) x IT C¥j n K) ~ IT (Z n K) 
i=l i=l j=l j=l 
to itself, 
'lj;: (8,p,q,).,cP,'Y,t,x,e,y,~) ~ 
( 
>.. </> ~ ~ ~ 
r(8 - t), 11(>",</»11' 11(>",</»II,)'(8,p,q,x,e,y,~) ,cP(8,p,q,x,e,y,~) ,'Y(8,p,q,x,e,y,~), 
t(8,p,q,x,e,y,~),x(8,p,q,y,~),e(8,p,q,y,~),y(p,q),Z(p,q)) 
where r is a continuous retraction from {u E JR.I: L{=l Ui = 1} to A that 
satisfies2 : (i) r(u) E aA implies that there exists some i such that r(u)i = 0 and 
Ui::; 0 and (ii) U tJ- A implies that r(u) E aA. 
2l\"ote that these conditions are satisfied by the two following c~es : 
r(u) = projA(u) the orthogonal projection over A 
r( u) = ( + ut +, ... , + ut +) (approach used by Neghishi) 
Ut +"'U1 Ut +"'U1 
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By applying the Maximum Theorem under convexity3 to Problem (3), we have 
are compact-valued, convex-valued, usc correspondences. Since by construction, 
t(8,p,q,x,8,y,~), r(8-t), 11(/4»11 and rom are also compact-valued, convex-
valued, usc correspondences. Finally, applying Gourdel Fixed-Point theorem4 (see 
Gourdel (1995)) on the correspondence 'IjJ, we get the existence of some 
such that: 
8* = r (8* - t*) , 
* >.* 
p = 11(>'*,4>*)11' 
* </;* 
q = 11(>'* ,</;*)11' 
(8* * * \ * -+'* * t* * 8* * c*) ,p,q,/\,'f',', ,x, ,Y,c.., 
\* \(8* * *\*-+.* *t* *8* *c*) \(8* * *\*-+.* *t* *8* *c*) /\ E /\ , P , q , /\ , 'f' ", , x, ,y, c.., or /\ ,p, q ,/\ ,'f' ,', ,x, ,y, c.., 
is empty, 
-+. * -;, (8* * * \ * -+. * * t* * 8* * c*) -;, (8* * * \ * -+. * * t* * 8* * c*) 
'f' E 'f' , P , q , /\ ,'f' ", ,x, ,y, c.., or 'f' ,p, q ,/\ , 'f' ,', , x, ,y, c.., 
is empty, 
* -;, (8* * * \ * -+. * * t* * 8* * c*) ~ (8* * * \ * -+. * * t* * 8* * c*) 
, E 'f' ,p, q ,/\ , 'f' ,', ,x, ,y, c.., or , ,p, q ,/\ ,'f' ,', ,x, ,y, c.., 
is empty, 
t * E t (8* * * \ * -+. * * t* * 8* * c*) t (8* * * \ * -+. * * t* * 8* * c*) , p ,q , /\ ,'f' ", , x, ,y, c.., or , p , q , /\ ,'f' ,', , x, , y , c.., 
is empty, 
x* E x(8*,p*,q*,y*,~*), 
8* E e (8*,p*, q*, y*, C), 
y* E fj (p* , q*) , 
C E Z (p*, q*) . 
We deduce from the last two conditions that ~ (8*, p*, q*, A *, cjJ*, ,*, t*, x*, 8*, y*, C) 
is non-empty (and consequently t (8*, p*, q*, A *, cjJ*, ,*, t*, x*, 8*, y*, C) is also non-
empty) which implies that the point is a fixed-point for 'IjJ 
(8* * * \ * -+.* * t* * 8* * c*) ni, (8* * * \ * -+.* * t* * 8* * c*) ,p,q,/\,'f',', ,x, ,y,c.., E'f' ,p,q,/\,'f',', ,x, ,y,c.., . 
In Step V, we will prove that A * =I 0, and consequently, p* =I 0 since p* = II(>';,~*)II' 
Hence, (p*, q*) =I O. 
Step IV: 
In view of step Il, it only remains to show that 8: » 0, in order to prove that 
((x*, 8*) , (y*, C) , (p*, q*)) is a GEl equilibrium. 
3 The 1Ia..ximum Theorem under convexity restrictions is a consequence of the Maximum The-
orem given by Berge (see Berge (1963), pp 115-116). The Maximum Theorem under convexity is 
presented in Sundaram (1996, pp 237-239) and Ginsburg and Keyzer (1997, pp 472-476). 
4 An alternative redaction may use the more sophisticated fixed-point theorem of Eilemberg-
l\Iontgomery (1946) to some acyclic correspondences. 
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We will prove by contradiction. Suppose that it is not the case, then since 8* is 
in the (relative) bordary of A, it follows from the property of the retraction r that 
for some i', 8:, = 0 and 8:, - t;, :::; o. 
By the colinearity of p*, q* and A *, (1/, respectively, it follows from the part c) of 
step II that t;, < O. This is a contradiction and therefore, wee have proved that 8 is 
in the (relative) interior of A, and consequently by condition (ii) on the retraction 
r, we deduce that 8* - t* E A, which implies that t* = O. 
Step V: 
Finally, note that A * » 0 will be implied by the nonsatiation assumption. We 
will use a proof by contradiction. Suppose that A:'k = 0. Let us consider i' such that 
8:, > 0. Taking \:Ii of- i', Xi = Xi, Bi = ei, Bi' = ei, and \:Is of- s', Xi's = Xi's from (4), it 
follows that 
Ui' (x;,o, ... , x;'s) + Vi'sA:' (Wi's' - x;'s,) 
> Ui' (x:,o, .. , Xi's', .. , X;'S) + Vi's'A:, . (Wi's' - Xi's') 
since 8:, > 0, in particular Ui'(X;,) ~ Ui'(X;, +Zk), for Zk = (0, ... ,0,1,0, ... ,0), that 
contradicts the monotonicity assumption. 
I I 
Moreover, since A* » 0, we have L x; =L Wi + Lf=lYj; i.e. the market 
i=l i=l 
clearing condition is verified . 
• We can also prove the existence of a GEl equilibrium ((x*, B*) , (y*, C) , (p*, q*)) , 
where (p*, q*) of- 0. Our approach will follow the plan already established in Theorem 
3. In this context, we assume that (p, q) E ~. 
Theorem 4 Existence of a GEl equilibrium. Let E be an economy satisfying 
conditions (H.1) to (HA), (H.7) to (H.15) and (H.17) and the following: 
H.5'. Locally nonsatiated: There exists at least one consumer i such that \:IXi E Xi 
and c > 0, there exists Zi E Xi n B (Xi, c) that satisfied Ui (Zi) > Ui (Xi) . 
H.6'. Cheaper Consumption Assumption: For every consumer, given a price vector 
s s 
(p, q) E ~ with p of- 0, there exists ~i E Xi such that L (Ps . ~is) < L (Ps' Wis)' 
s=o s=o 
H.16'. The set of allocations 
A= 
is nonempty, closed, and bounded. 
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H.17'. For each (p,q) Ell, the set 
IF(p,q)= {(x,£1) Ei[Il (Xi X Z): :3(y,~) E (y(p,q),Z(p,q)) , ((x,£1),(y,~)) EA, 
Ps . Xis:::; Ps· Wis + Ps . As (p, q) . £1i , Vs = 1, ... , S, Vi = 1, ... , I} 
is nonempty. 
Then there exists a GEl equilibrium (( x* , £1*) , (y*, C) , (p* , q*)) , with (p~ q*) i- o. 
Proof. 
The Theorem 4 states sufficient conditions under which an GEl equilibrium ex-
ists. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 3 considering the following mathemat-
ical programming problem, instead of Problem (3) of Theorem 3: 
Let (Yj (p, q) ,Zj (p, q)) be the optimal decisions of firms for all (p, q) E Ll. These 
correspondences are compact-valued, convex-valued and usc. Note that these corre-
spondences are well-defined at (p, q) = O. 
Then, consider (p, q) E Ll, (y,O E Y and 6 E A such that define the following 
problem, 
I 
M ax L: 6i Ui (XiO, ... , XiS) 
s.t. i=l 
I I 
L: XiO = L: WiO + L:J=l fiJo (p, q) , 
i=l i=l 
I ~ I I 
L: Xis + L:J=l As (p, q) . ~j (p, q) = L: Wis + L:J=l fiJs (p, q) + L: As (p, q) . £1i, Vs = 1, ... , S, 
i=l i=l i=l 
I ~ 
L: £1 i = L:J=l ~j (p, q) , 
i=l 
Ps· Xis:::; Ps . Wis + Ps . As· £1i , Vs = 1, ... , S, Vi = 1, ... , 1, 
Xi E Xi, £1i E Z. 
(8) 
The solution of this problem 
(x (6,p, q, y,~), e (6,p, q, y,~), >: (6,p, q, y,~) , ~ (6,p, q, y,~), 9 (6,p, q, y,~)) 
are compact-valued, convex-valued, usc correspondences. Note that by Assumption 
(H.5'), the multipliers are nonzero for all (p, q) E Ll, (y,~) E Y and 6 E A. 
Using a similar fixed point argument to that of Theorem 3, there exists a fixed 
point 
( J;:* * * \ * A. * * t* * ll* * c*) U,P,q,A,,+,,,,(, ,X,u,y,<" 
of correspondence 'lj;. Since 
(
).* cjJ*) 
(p*,q*) E 11().*,cjJ*)II' 11().*,cjJ*)11 ' 
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we can assure (p*, q*) i=- O. 
The rest of proof is identical to that of Theorem 3 without considering step V . 
• We can also prove the existence of a GEl equilibrium ((x*, ()*) , (y*, C) , (p*, q*)) , 
with asset prices nonnegative q* 2 O. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 3 
considering the following inequality constraints 
I J I: (}i ~ I:Zj (p, q) 
i=l j=l 
instead of 
I J 
I: (}i = L:Zj (p, q) 
i=l j=l 
in Problem (3) of Theorem 3. This result allows the excess supply of assets, in 
equilibrium, is free since the utility functions do not depend on the financial assets 
and hence, the nonsatiation assumption does not imply that asset prices are nonzero 
in equilibrium; i.e. q* i=- O. 
4 Characterization of a two-period GEl equilib-
. 
rlum 
In this section we provide a characterization of an equilibrium relaxing the standard 
convexity assumptions and the limited short-selling assumption. We also consider a 
two period production model to be as simple as possible 
We first introduce the concept of local equilibria. Then, we characterize a local 
equilibrium as a solution of a system of nonlinear equations. 
Definition 5 Local GEl Equilibrium. The vector prices (p*, q*) E IRD(S+l) x IRc , 
with (p*, q*) i=- 0, and the allocation 
I J 
((x*, ()*) ,(y*, ~*)) E IT (Xi X Z) x IT (Yj x Z), 
i=l j=l 
is a local is a GEl equilibrium for the economy E, if there exists c > 0 such that: 
CPL Each consumer solves its local problem; i. e. 
M ax Ui (Xio, ... , XiS) 
s.t. 
Po . XiO ~ Po . Wio - q. (}i, 
Ps . Xis ~ Ps . Wis + Ps . As . (}i, Vs = 1, ... , S, 
Xi E Xi n B (X;,c) , (}i E Z n B (():, c) . 
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FPL Each firm solves its local problem; i. e. 
l1.~x OJ(Yj'~j,p,q) 
Po . YjO + q . ~j = 0 
Ps· Yjs - Ps· As . ~j = 0, Vs = 1, ... , S, 
YjEYjnB(yj,e)", ~iEZnB(~~,e). 
MC Market clearing: 
I I J 
L x: = L Wi + L yj, 
i=l i=l j=l i=l j=l 
The local GEl equilibrium concept fails to satisfy the completeness property of 
consumers' preferences, see Mas eolell et al. (1995) p. 6. But note that in applied 
models we may not be able to know a full specification of the market. Modelers 
may address these problems by using local estimations of production functions, 
preferences and consumption sets. A further discussion of this issue can be found in 
Esteban, Gourdel and Prieto (2000). 
The local equilibrium concept is more realistic than the traditional equilibrium 
definition. It is important to emphasize that in this model, the local equilibria with 
nonnegative prices are defined on the sets {Xi n B (x;, c)} ~=1 ' {Z n B (0:, e)} :=1 ' 
{Yj n B (Yj, e)} :=1 and {Z n B (~;, e)} :=1. These sets can be interpreted as infor-
mation sets of the agents regarding their technologies and their preferences. We can 
assume that a local equilibrium will change when the agents get new information. 
This is actually what we observe in the real world. 
As discussed in the introduction, the most of the literature on computation of 
general equilibria uses the excess demand function using the concept of no-arbitrage 
equilibrium. But, note that in applied models it is really difficult to specify the 
functional form of the demand and supply functions. In order to compute a local 
equilibrium, it is necessary to state practical conditions that characterize local GEl 
equilibria and suggest algorithms for finding these points. We will assume some 
smoothness properties to characterize a local GEl equilibrium as the solution of a 
system of non-linear equations. 
Another important issue is the difficulty of meeting the required assumptions of 
existence's theorems given in Section 3. The next theorem states sufficient conditions 
to characterize a local equilibrium for the economy E, relaxing the limited short-
selling and the standard convexity assumptions. Furthermore, the characterization 
of a GEl equilibrium only require the continuity of the matrix asset A (p, q) in the 
neighborhood of the solution point (p*, q*). 
vVithout loss of generality, we assume that the consumption set of the i - th 
consumer is described by inequality constraints 
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the technology of the j - th firm is described by 
V· = {y. E IRD(S+l) . p. (y.) < o} J J 'JJ-, 
and the asset space Z = IRc. An inequality constraint is said to be active at a given 
point if it is satisfied with equality at this point. 
Consider the product spaces 
and 
I J 
r + = IR~~+l)X IT (XiX i) X IT (Vjx i) x 6.+ x IR~ x IR~ x IRJ (S+1) 
i=l j=l 
I 
r - ITDI(S+l) IT (w. 
- m.++ X .i';;.2X 
i=l 
J i) x IT (Vjx i) x 6. x IR~ x IR~ x IRJ (S+l). 
j=l 
The next theorem provides a characterization of local GEl equilibria. 
Theorem 6 Characterization of local GEl equilibria. Let E be an economy 
satisfying conditions (H.1), (H.2), (H.5), (H.7) , (H.8) , (H.ll) , (H.12) and (H.15). 
If there exists a point 
* (~* * e* * C* * * * * *) r z = u,x, ,y,<."p,q,W,/-l,"( E +, 
that satisfies the following conditions: 
H.3'. Xi n B (x;, E) is convex Vi, 
H.4'. Ui (.) is concave in Xi n B (x;, E), Vi, 
H.9'. Vj n B (yj, E) =f. 0 is convex, Vj, 
H.lD'. OJ (Yj'~j,p,q) is concave in Vj n B (yj,E) and Z n B (~;,E), V(p,q) E 
IR D(S+1)+c VJ' , , 
H.l3'. ZnB(e;,E), Vi, andZnB(~;,E), Vj, are convex. 
H.l4'. The return functions As (p, q) are nonnegative, continuous, and homoge-
neous of degree zero in B ((p*, q*) , E) . 
H.l8. Ui (.) is continuously differentiable in Xi n B (x;, E) and Gi (.) is continuously 
differentiable in Xi n B(X;,E), Vi, . 
H.l9. OJ (Yj'~j'P' q) is continuously differentiable in VjnB (yj,E) andZnB (~;,E), 
V (p, q) E IRD(S+l)+C, and Fj (-) is continuously differentiable in Vj n B (yj, E), 
Vj, 
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H.20. rank (As (p*, q*)) = D, Vs, 
and the following holds: 
(9) 
then ((x*, e*) , (y*, C) , (p*, q*)) is a local GEl equilibrium for the economy E. 
Proof. 
First, note that it is assumed that (x*, e*, y*, C) is a feasible point of Problem 
(3) , i.e. the allocation (x*, e*, y*, C) E A. 
On the other hand, z* satisfies the first-order condition of Problem (3) and 
Problem (2), by Assumption (H.5) , (H.ll) and taking 8:0 = 1 /ViO , 8:s = l/vis , 
Vs = 1, ... , Sand (p*, q*) = (II(/~')II' II(/~')II)' Then, by (H.3'), (HA'), (H.9'), 
(H.lO') , (H.13') and (H.14'), we have that z* is a local optimum of Problem (3). 
See Avriel (1976), Th. 4.38, p. 96, Bertsekas (1995), Prop. 3.1., pp 254-281 and 
Bazaraa et al (1979), Th. 6.2.5, pp. 209-210. 
On the other hand, z* also satisfies the fixed point conditions required by The-
orem 
(
),* (j/) 
(p*,q*) = II()'*, (P*)II , II()'*, (P*)II ' 
),~T (x:o - Wio) + cp*Te: = 0, Vi, 
),:T (x:s - Wis - As . en = 0, Vi, Vs = 1, ... , S, 
and 8; > 0, we have that ((x*, e*) , (y*, C) , (p*, q*)) is a local GEl equilibrium . 
• 
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Assumption (H.16) is the constraint qualification under differentiability. As-
suming rank (As (p* , q*)) = D, Vs, the constraint gradients associated to condi-
tions defined by A and balance equations are always linear independent. Then, 
(x*, 8*, y*, C) E A is a regular point5 of Problem (3). 
Note that the Assumption rank (As (p* , q*)) = D, Vs, does not imply that the 
financial markets are complete. For example, if As (p*, q*) = Asl (p*, q*) , Vs -=1= s', 
such that rank (As (p*, q*)) = D, we have that rank (p* A (p*, q*)) = 1 -=1= s. 
Analogously, we can establish other sufficient conditions for the characlerization 
of a local GEl equilibrium allowing for the existence of negative spot prices. 
Proposition 7 Characterization of local equilibria. Let E be an economy sat-
isfying conditions (H.l), (H.2), (H.3'), (H.4'), (H.5'), (H.7), (H.8), (H.9'), (H.lD'), 
(H.ll), (H.12), (H.13'), (H.14'), (H.15), (H.18), (H.19) and (H.20). If there exists 
a point 
* ( £* * 8* * c* * * * * *) r z = U,X, ,y,r.",p,q,W,!-",,",( E , 
that satisfies the conditions (g), then ((x*, 8*) , (y*, C) , (p*, q*)) is a local GEl equi-
librium for the economy E. 
The characterization a GEl equilibrium is described by inequality constraints 
that can be transformed them into equations by adding nonnegative slack variables. 
For example, let consider 
then we may consider an equivalent technology set fj 2: 0 
where fj are nonnegative slack variables. Therefore, a GEl equilibrium is charac-
terized by equalities constraints together with bound constraints. Let H (z) = 0 
denote the system (g) of nonlinear equations that characterize a GEl equilibrium, 
where z now contains the variables and slacks; and 1 ::; z ::; u denote the bound 
constraints, where land u are vectors of lower and upper bounds on the components 
of z. Some components of z may lack a lower or an upper bound, in these cases we 
set the appropriate components of land u to -00 and +00, respectively. 
Note that we assume that the portfolios 8*, C are interior points of Z. We can 
extend all previous results allowing that 8*, C E 87L In such a case, let consider 
Z = {8 : H (8) :::; O}. Then, the characterization a GEl equilibrium is given by the 
following additional conditions: 'T/H (8) = 0, H (8) ::; 0, where 'T/ denote the Lagrange 
multiplier associated to H (8) ::; 0, and the conditions 
5 A feasible vector (x*, y*) for which the active constraint gradients are linearly independent 
is called regular. Equivalently, a feasible vector (x*, y*) for which the matrix of active constraint 
gradients has full row rank is called regular. 
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should be modified adequately. 
Finally, note that when the functions Ui, Oj, Gi and Fj are not differentiable (but 
still convex and finite everywhere) the conditions to characterize an equilibrium 
are similar, except that we have to take into account the sub differentials of such 
functions instead of their gradients. For an introduction to nonsmooth optimization 
see, for example, Rockafellar (1970, 1981), Clarke (1990). In practice most economic 
models consider differentiability assumptions. 
4.1 No arbitrage condition 
As discussed in the introduction, the idea of arbitrage and absence of arbitrage 
opportunities is a basic concept of finance. It is well-known that under Assump-
tion (H.5), if there exists an equilibrium, then the financial market must not offer 
arbitrage opportunities. 
Consider the system (9) of nonlinear equations that characterize a GEl equilib-
rium given in Section 4. Note that a local GEl equilibrium satisfies the following 
conditions: 
whenever the asset's portfolio in equilibrium is an interior point of Z. 
In Finance Theory, this is known as no-arbitrage condition. If this condition is 
satisfied, the market is said to not offer arbitrage opportunities. This condition is 
equivalent to the no-free-Iunch property (it is not possible to produce any good in 
positive amount without using some other good as a input). 
Under no-arbitrage condition, we can consider an alternative concept of eqUilib-
rium known as normalized no-arbitrage equilibrium. See Magill and Shafer (1991). 
The importance of this equilibrium concept is that its allocations coincide with those 
of the GEl equilibrium and the proofs of existence of equilibria based on Grassma-
nians are simplified. See Duffie and Shafer (1985). 
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5 Local Uniqueness of two-period GEl equilibria 
Having established in Section 3 conditions under which a GEl equilibrium 
I J 
((x*,e*) , (y*,C) ,p*,q*) E IT (Xi X Z) x IT (Yj x Z) x ~ 
i=l j=l 
is guaranteed to exist, we now study its local uniqueness. 
Firstly, we establish sufficient conditions under a GEl equilibrium are functions 
(instead of correspondences) in 8* E A so that 0 E t (8*). This is an immediate 
consequence of Maximum Theorem for a convex program (see Sundaram (1996), 
pp. 237-239). 
Then, we prove that, under certain conditions, there exist a unique 8* that defines 
an unique GEl equilibrium for the economy E. 
Proposition 8 Let ((x*, e*) , (y*, C) ,p*, q*) be a local GEl equilibrium. For each 
8* E A such that 0 E t (8*) , we have: 
1. Under strictly local concavity, for each vector price (p*, q*) E ~ the allocations 
in equilibrium (( x* , e*) , (y*, C)) is locally unique. 
2. Under the assumptions (H.4') , (H.lD') , (H.18) , (H.19) and (H.20) , the prices 
(p*, q*) E ~ associated to ((x*, e*) , (y*, C)) are locally unique. 
Proof. 
1. The result is an immediate consequence of the optimality properties for a 
convex constrained problem. See Avriel (1976), Th. 4.31,4.32, pp. 92-93, Bertsekas 
(1995), Prop. 1.1.2, p. 12 and Bazaraa et al (1979), Th. 3.4.2, p. 101. 
2. The result is an immediate consequence of the Lagrange Multiplier Theorem 
for a convex constrained problem. See Avriel (1976), Th. 3.8, 3.9 pp. 41-45, 
Bertsekas (1995), Prop. 3.1, 3.2, pp. 254-282 and Bazaraa et al (1979), Th. 4.3.7, 
4.3.8, pp. 162-165 .• 
But, note that the previous proposition does not guarantee the local uniqueness 
of an equilibrium due to the parameter 8* E A. We now prove, under stronger 
conditions, the uniqueness of such an equilibrium. 
Proposition 9 Under assumptions given by Theorem 6 and the following one: 
V.M. H is uniformly monotone on Do6, where H is the system of non-linear equa-
tions H : Do --+ r, defined by Section 4, such that Do c r is an opened and 
convex set, 
G A mapping H : D c ]Rn ---; ]Rn is uniformly monotone on Do CD, an opened convex set, iff 
there exists I > 0 such that (H (x) - H (y)) (x - y) ~ I (x - yf (x - y) , 'ix, y E Do· 
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there exists a unique z* E Do such that H (z*) = 0. Hence, there exists a unique 
GEl equilibrium (( x* , e*) , (y* , C) ,p* , q*) for the economy E. 
Proof. 
It is an immediate consequence of the monotonicity of operator H. See Ortega 
and Rheinboldt (1970), pp. 141-145 . 
• Ortega and Rheinboldt (1970, pp. 142) provide sufficient conditiollS- for this 
assumption (UM.) 
6 Computing local two-period GEl equilibria 
In this section we outline how a local equilibrium can be computed using Interior-
Point Methods. We consider the system of nonlinear equations given by Section 4, 
H (z) = 0, where z E Do and the bounds constraints of the form l ::; z ::; u. As we 
have shown, the solutions of this system are equilibria for a given economy E. Note 
that we cannot solve this system using traditional methods (Newton's method) due 
to the simple bounds. \Ve will solve an alternative inequality-constrained optimiza-
tion problem: 
Min 
z 
~ IIH(z)ll~ 
(10) s.t. 
l ::; z ::; u. 
using Interior Point Methods for non-linear programming. 
During the 1960s, many techniques were derived for unconstrained optimization. 
It was standard practice to convert a constrained problem into a sequence of un-
constrained problems, by incorporating to the objective function additional terms 
that would add arbitrarily-high costs either for infeasibility or for approaching the 
boundary of the feasible region. The most popular of these approaches for inequality 
constrained problems was the use of barrier methods. Interior point methods are 
closely related to the classical logarithmic barrier methods. The barrier method is 
defined by introducing a parameter j.L, called the barrier parameter, and a logarith-
mic barrier function that is defined in the interior of the feasible set of the original 
problem. 
Interior point methods transform this inequality-constrained optimization prob-
lem into a sequence of equality-constrained optimization subproblems defined as: 
Min (11) 
Under mild conditions, every limit point of a sequence {z* (j.L)} of local minimiz-
ers of these problems is a local minimum of the original constrained problem; i.e. 
z* (j.L) -t z* as j.L ---+ O. This method was studied by Fiacco and McCormick (1968). 
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In spite of the good properties of this method, it became unpopular because of the 
numerical ill-conditioning of the barrier Hessian. Recently, it was proved that under 
conditions that normally hold in practice, this ill-conditioning does not degrade the 
accuracy of the computed solution. See Wright, M. (1997) and Wright, S. (1998). 
In 1984, Karmarkar presented a polynomial-time linear programming method. 
In 1986, Gill et al. showed that there is an equivalence between Karmarkar's method 
and logarithmic barrier methods. Since then, interior-points have become very pop-
ular. For an introduction to interior point methods see, e.g. Wright, M. tl--998) and 
its references, and for details, see Nesterov and Nemirovskii (1994). 
When interior point methods are applied to Problem (11), the corresponding 
first-order conditions have the form: 
J(zkf H(Zk) - J1 (Zk - L)-1 + J1 (U - Zk)-1 = 0, 
where Zk = diag(Zk) , L = diag (l), U = diag (u) and J(Zk) denote the Jacobian 
matrix of H. 
Let W1 = J1 (Zk - L)-1 and W~ = J1 (U - Zk)-1 , then we can rewrite the first-
order conditions as 
J(zkf H(Zk) - wl + w~ = 0, 
(Zk- L )W1-J1=0, 
(U - Z k) wl - J1 = 0, 
1 2 0 wk,wk> , 
that we will denote as by F (Zk' wl, wD = O. This is the standard primal-dual system 
that we will solve using Newton algorithm (See e.g. Dennis and Schnabel (1996, pp 
86-154)): 
Step 1. Let Zo, W6, w6 and c > O. Set k = 1, Zk +- Zo, Wk +- W6, and w~ +- w6. 
Step 2. If IIF (Zk' Wk, w~)112 < c, stop (the problem is solved); else, solve the system 
W1 (Zk - L) 0 b.w1 = -F (Zk' wl, w~) . ( 
J(zkf H(Zk) 1 -1) ( b.z ) 
-W~ 0 (U - Zk) b.w2 
Step 3. Compute az, awl, aw2 E (0,1) such that Zk+1 = Zk + azb.z, Wk+1 = Wk + 
a W lb.w1 and W~+1 = w~ + aw2b.w2 are feasible. 
Step 4. Consider the merit function 
1 2 I I 
M (z; J1) = '2 IIH(z)112 - J1 L log (Zi -li) - J1 L log (Ui - Zi), 
i=1 i=1 
and let m (a) = M (z + ab.z; J1). 
While m (0) - m (az) < -p az 'V m (O? b.z, where 0 < p < 1, set az +- az/2 
and Zk+1 = Zk + azb.z. 
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Step 5. Update 
(Zk - if wl + (u - zkf w~ 
J.L - "t 2D ' 
where 0 :::; "t < 1, and k - k + 1 and go back to step 2. 
To apply the interior-point method, we have to ensure that J (z) exists at the 
solution z*. This is not a restrictive requirement. Hens (1998, p. 143) pointed out 
that the point where demand is discontinuous is no longer a candidate equilibrium 
point. Therefore, these methods are applicable in a neighbourhood of the solution z* 
and as a consequence, the counterexamples like that of Hart (1975) are exceptional. 
The parameter J.L measures the average value of the pairwise products (Zk -if wl 
and (u - zkf w~. The success of this algorithm depends critically on the choice of 
the parameters J.L and "t. Unfortunately, difficulties can arise if unsuitable values of 
these parameters are used. See e.g. Wright, M. (1998). 
6.1 Some examples 
To illustrate this approach, we present some examples. 
Example 10 Two period exchange economy. DeMarzo and Eaves {1996}. 
Consider a GEl exchange economy with three consumers, three states in the 
second period, two assets and two goods. The consumer i - th has an utility function 
3 
of the form Ui(X) = L N8 (B - X~iX!2ai) ,where B = 57, N = (1,~,~,~) ,et1 = et2 = 
8=1 
~ and et3 = i and initial endowments 
W1 W2 = (10,10; 25, 20; 20, 20; 15, 20f , 
W3 (20,20;5,10; 10,10;15,20)T. 
The return matrix A is given by 
AT = [ 1 
2 -1 
o 1 
1 
o 1 
o 2 
Taking as an initial point Zo 
converges to the equilibrium 
[1, W1, W2, W3, IV, the interior-point algorithm 
xi x; = [17.01,7.76; 24.39,11.66; 21.61,10.37; 18.13, 7.9]T, 
x; [5.96,24.47; 6.2, 26.67; 6.77, 29.25; 8.72, 34.19]T, 
ei e; = [-0.6340, -4.4395]T, e; = [1.2681, 8.879]T, 
in 17 steps. The following table provides some information on the implementation 
of the algorithm for this example: 
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k 11 Zk±:k-Zk II? ~ IIH(zk) 11; \7 H(Zk)T H(Zk) jJ, alpha 
1 1.16e-1 6.47e+6 2.58e+1O 6.98e-2 0.99 
2 1.09e-1 3.1e+5 1e+9 1. 12e-2 1 
3 2.05e-1 7.43e+03 2.5e+7 2.56e-3 1 
17 7e-5 3.74e-23 2.34e-7 2.05e-15 1 
Example 11 Two period exchange economy. Schemedders {1998}. 
Now, we consider a slight variation of Example 1. We assume that the initial 
endowments of agent 3 is given by 
W3 = (20,20; 8, 24; 10,30; 6, 18f . 
Taking as an initial point Zo = [1, Wl, W2, W3, lV, the interior-point algorithm con-
verges to the equilibrium 
x~ x; = [16.70,7.2; 24.77,12.62; 21.04, 13; 14.59, 9.34]T, 
x; = [6.58,25.58; 8.45, 38.75; 7.9,43.98; 6.81, 39.3]T, 
e~ = e; = [4.0106, -6.7346]T, e; = [-8.0211, 13.4692r , 
in 17 steps. The following table provides some information on the implementation 
of the algorithm for this example: 
k 11 Zk±:k-Zk II? ~ IIH(zk) 11; \7 H(Zk)T H(Zk) jJ, alpha 
1 1.4e-1 6.33e+6 2.53e+1O 7.4ge-2 0.98 
2 8.42e-2 2.86e+3 2.5e+5 2.25e-2 1 
3 4.5e-1 1.98e+02 9.05e+4 7.66e-3 1 
17 2.26e-5 1.4e-24 4.98e-8 1.53e-15 1 
Example 12 Two period production economy. 
Consider a production economy with three consumers, one producer, three states 
in the second period, two assets and two goods. We assume that the consumers are 
characterized as Example 1. The firm is profit-maximizers and has a production set 
y = {(Yl, Y2) : Y2 = 16 - (Yl + 4)2}. Given an initial point Zo = IT, the interior-
point algorithm converges to 
x~ x; = [13.82,8.56; 23.16,15.45; 20.41,13.75; 17.6, 9.57f, 
x; [5.19,28.95; 5.67,34.08; 6.18, 37.47; 8.29, 40.6]T, 
y* [-7.15,6.07; -2.99, 14.99; -2.98, 14.97; -1.501, 9.75]T, 
e~ e; = [0.1773, -2.8564]T, e; = [3.9281, 5.8534]T , 
C [4.2828, 0.1405r , 
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in 25 steps. 
It is important to clarify that interior point methods converge to a stationary 
point. Such a point is a global minimum if H is convex, but this need not be so for 
nonconvex problems. Thus, it is recommended to run this method from multiple 
starting points. 
On the other hand, if a interior point method starts at any stationary point, 
including a local minimum, it may not stop at that point. This depends critically 
on the choice of the parameter /1. 
As discussed in the introduction, Schmedders (1998) compute equilibria with 
homotopy techniques using the first-order conditions of the nonarbitrage agents' 
problem. In order to avoid discontinuities in the excess demand correspondence, he 
consider one agent with penalties for transactions on the asset markets instead of 
assuming lower bounds on short sales. By making these penalties larger and larger, 
the solutions of the homotopy function are closer and closer to the GEl equilibrium. 
The main inconvenience of homotopy methods is that these methods may fail 
to produce a solution even to a fairly simple system of nonlinear equations. Fur-
thermore, these methods typically require significantly more function and derivative 
evaluations and linear algebra operations than the methods presented in this section. 
7 General GEl model 
Having studied the standard two periods GEl model, in this section we extend 
all previous results of the two periods GEl model to multiple periods in a simple 
manner. 
We also consider a private ownership market economy with I consumers and J 
firms and a finite number of perfectly divisible commodities and financial assets. 
We also assume that there exist L goods, that can be placed at M states of the 
world in which it is available, E locations in space and T dates of availability. 
Each financial asset is a promise to deliver an amount of good in a certain state of 
world. The markets on which the commodities and the financial assets are traded 
are assumed to be competitive, so that agents believe that they can buy and sell 
as many commodities or assets as they want without affecting their prices. As 
before, all relevant information is symmetric across economic agents. Hence, the 
first extension is of the information structure. 
7.1 Information structure 
Now we consider a model that is characterized by the information available at each 
period of time. We also assume that this information is the same for all agents. In 
this setting we need to consider a formal representation of information that is given 
by the concept of information structure. 
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Definition 13 Information structure. Given a finite sample space 0 = {W1' ... , W M } 
that represents the states of world, an information structure is a sequence of (J-
algebra {Ft} i=l such that: 
1. F1 = {O, 0} , 
2. FT = P (0), 
3. Ft+l is finer than Ft, Vt = 1, ... , T - 1. 
In other words, each (J-algebra Ft is a collection of events that are known at time 
t. The condition (3) excludes the loss of information between t + 1 and t, that is, as 
time passes their knowledge does not decrease. 
The information structure can be specified endogenous or exogenously. The in-
formation is exogenous when it is revealed by variables that agents do not control. 
On the other hand, the information is endogenous when the decision of agents de-
pends on decision taking until the current state. Note that if all agents know the 
decision rules of the rest of agents and the information structure is symmetric, then 
the endogenous information coincides with the exogenous one. 
With this temporal setting, we now need to be explicit about the commodity 
T 
space. We assume that the commodity space of the model is vector space IT jRDxFt, 
t=l 
where D = L E and 
In the context of stochastic programming, the constraints 
ht E jRDXFt, \::It = 1, ... , T 
are known as non-anticipativity constraints since these constraints guarantee that 
decisions made today cannot depend on information received tomorrow (or any day 
thereafter) . 
Note that a model defined by these constraints quickly becomes large as the 
number of decision dates and the cardinality of the sample space increase. And 
so, these models may be difficult to compute. Fortunately, we can consider an 
equivalent and simple way to consider these constraints that reduces the dimension 
of the model. To this end, we present the concepts of determining class and finitely 
generated (J-algebra. 
Definition 14 The partition Ft = {Fn ;!,1 c 0 is said to be a determining class 
of the (J-algebra Ft, if it is the smallest (J-algebra generated by the class Ft. That 
is denoted by (J (Ft) = Ft. (See Billingsley (1968), p. 15). The sets Fts E Ft are 
known as scenarios. 
If {Fd i=l is a filtration, then their determining classes {Ft} i=l are nested. 
32 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Definition 15 The a-algebra Ft is said to be finitely generated if there exist a finite 
determining class Ft. If Ft is finite, then it is finitely generated. 
If D = {W1, .... , W M} is finite, every filtration {Ft} ;=1 has finitely generated a-
algebras. Note that Fr = D and Sr = M, since Fr = F = P (D) . 
For example, the information structure of the two-periods GEl model is given 
by the a-algebras {Fa, F1} where Fa = {D,0} and F1 = D = {W1' ... , ws} and the 
finite determining classes Fa = D and F1 = {{ W1}, ... , {ws}}, respectively. 
If the a-algebra Ft is finitely generated by Ft, then ht is Ft - measurable iff 
ht (w) is constant in w EFtS, for each s = 1, ... , St. Let 
hFt = ht (w), Vw E Ft 
denote such a value. Hence, the non-anticipativity constraints ht E lRDxFt is equiv-
alent to rewrite ht (w) as 
hFt = (hFl' ... , hFtt) with hFt E lRD , Vs = 1, ... , St. 
Note that hFt E lRDSt whereas we obtain ht (.) E lRDM by dropping the non-
anticipativity constraints. Hence, these constraints reduce the dimension of the prob-
lem. 
For example, in the two-periods GEl model, Xa = x (Fa) = x (D) denotes the 
consumption plan at t = 0 and Xl = (x (W1) , ... , x (ws)) = X (F1) denotes the con-
sumption plan at t = 1. 
Summarizing, the commodity space is IT lRDSt = lRL * where L* = D· (f St) 
t=l t=l 
and the vectors hFt are defined as above. Each commodity has a market price that 
is defined in the vector space lRL *. 
Note that for each h E lRL *, a unique sequence of decisions corresponding to 
wED is realized. This idea can be expressed by means of the concept of scenario 
tree, that is defined as 
8'= U Ft, 
where 1r = {I, ... , T} and §t = {I, ... , St} . Each Fts is called tree node or scenario. 
Each scenario tree is entitled to the preorder relation F >- F' iff the node F' suc-
ceeded to F if F' c F. In this case, it is obvious that :3 t, t' such that t' > t and 
F eFt, F' c F t f • 
In general, we can consider that each wED is identified by a terminal node F;T E Fr. On the other hand, note that each branch of the tree (the path from the 
root Fa of the tree to a leaf) corresponds to a event wED. Hence, without lack of 
generality, we can identify each w with the associated vector of nodes of the brand 
tree7 . Analogously, an non-terminal node Ftt E Ft can be identified by the subpath 
from the root of the tree to that node. 
7In practice, the notation 
- (FSI PST) W - 1 , ..... , T , 
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The main issue of this approach in practical is dimensionality. If we consider T 
time periods, the number of scenarios needed to model the informational structure is 
T L: St. Moreover, St often grows exponentially with t. Hence, the scenario tree can be 
t=l 
expanded to arbitrarily large sizes as the temporal horizon T increases. Then great 
difficulties arise from the computational point of view. However, in the literature on 
stochastic programming, there exist computational methods that allows to handle 
large models. Surveys in this area are due to Ermoliev and Wets (1988)~nd Wets 
(1989). 
7.2 Financial system 
Trading occurs at each information set. In order to provide instruments that enable 
each agent to trade among the different markets, we must extend the economy by 
the addition of financial assets. 
For each scenario F, we assume that there exist CF financial assets. Let C denote 
the number of all financial assets. Let e~ E lR denote t4e number of units of the 
asset c that is held by some agent at period t. When ec (tj > 0, the agent is worthy 
of the asset c, and otherwise, the agent is debtor. A portfolio of assets at period t 
is defined as 
eF = (e}, ... , e~F)T E lRCF . 
Each portfolio e F has a vector of market price qF E lRCF and deliver a future 
dividends that are defined by means of a family of matrices 
A(e,F): VG >- F, 
DXCF 
where each A(e,F) represents the dividends of the portfolio eF at scenario G >- F. 
The short-lived dividends are delivered at the immediate successors of its node of 
issue F, and the long-lived dividends are deliver after the immediate successors of 
F. Let Pc denote the prices of real goods at scenario G, then the dividends' value of 
the portfolio e F at scenario G >- F is 
Pc . A(e,F) eF 
lxD DXCF CFxl 
On the other hand, the dividends' value at scenario G of a collection of portfolios 
purchased at the predecessor's scenarios of G is 
can be useful to design the set n. 
34 
If we consider all scenarios at period t, instead of a scenario F, then for each 
period t, it can be possible to define the financial assets 
with a price 
_ ( TT) T E 1T])L:;~1 GFt 
q - qFl' .... , qFtt .IN.. • 
Obviously, the dividends of 8Ft at period T > t can be written as 
( 
A(F1 F1) 
.,., t 
A(F;"',Fl) 
A(F1 FSt) ) ( 8F 1 ) r' t t 
A(Fl: ,F;"') B ;", 
where we assume that the matrix A(G,F) is zero if it is not satisfied that G >- F. 
Hence, the set of all feasible financial assets is described by the vectors 
with a market price 
q= 
If we summarize the dividends of all assets 8 for every period of time, we have 
the following dividends matrix 
0 0 0 
A(F2,F1) 0 0 ( BF~ ) A(} A(F3,F1) A(F3,F2) 0 0 T 
DL: St xl 8FT _ 1 
t=l 
A(FT,F1) A(FT ,F2) A(FT,FT_1) T-1 St L: L: GFs xl 
T T-1 St t=l s=l t 
DL: St X L: L: GFs 
t=l t=l s=l t 
The matrix A is known as dividends or returns matrix. 
7.3 The firms 
We assume that the jth firm maximizes an objective function (e.g. its profit) on its 
production set Yj C lRL *. We also allow that firm issues or purchases real financial 
assets. In such a case, firms are covered against a risk of future production. For each 
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scenario F, let ~jF denote the portfolio of real assets of the jth firm, characterized 
by the price market qF and the dividend's matrix ACG,F) , with G >- F. In such 
a case, firm is under an obligation to deliver the production promised at previous 
scenarios. 
A production set Yj is described by means of a set offunctions Fj (.) : jRL* --t jRKj, 
called transformation functions, 
These dynamic constraints play a crucial role in the production decision process, 
since the firm is directly affected by its past decision. 
Without loss of generality, we assume that the jth firm's objective is given by 
the function 
L* C OJ : Yj x Z x jR x jR --t R 
To model the behavior of the firm in this context, it is a difficult task. We 
can consider a large number of different objectives as many as the firms' behavior. 
Usually, firms are profit maximizers over production and financial transactions 
Then, given the price vectors (p, q) E jRL* X jRc, the jth firm faces the problem 
Max 
s.t. 
OJ (Yj'~j,p,q) 
PFo . YjFo + qFo . ~jFo = 0, 
PF . YjF - PF . LG-<F ACF,G)~jG + qF . ~jF = 0, VF E ~ \ {Fa U FT}, 
PF . YjF - PF . LG-<F ACF,G)~jG = 0, V F E FT 
Yj E Y j , ~i E Z. 
(12) 
Under convexity and compactness assumptions, the existence of solutions for 
this problem can be proved by the Maximum Theorem. These solutions are corre-
spondences denoted by yj = Yj (p, q)and ~; = ~j (p, q) . Furthermore, under strong 
convexity, such solutions are functions. 
7.4 The consumers 
A consumer is an individual agent (a single household or a family) who takes se-
quentially decisions regarding its demand for goods and services and the supply of 
different types of labor. 
The choice set for the ith consumer is given by a subset Xi c jRL* which describes 
feasible consumption vectors. Each consumer has preferences given by a utility 
function Ui : Xi --t jR and is endowed with a vector Wi E Xi. In order to transfer 
income between scenarios, consumer have to hold assets. For each scenario F, let 
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BiF C IRCF denote the portfolio of real assets traded at market price qF E IRCF. The 
payoff of an asset is given by ACG,F) at scenario G>- F. 
Thus, given the price vectors (p, q) E IRL* X IRc, the ith consumer faces the 
problem, 
M ax Ui (Xi) 
s.t .. 
PFo . XiFo + qFo . BiFo :S PFo . WiFo, 
PF' XiF + qF' BiF :S PF' WiF + PP" L ACF,G)' BiG, \::IF E CS \ {Fb--U FT}, 
G-<F 
PF . XiF :S PF . WiF + PF' L ACF,G)' BiG, \::IF EFT, 
G-<F 
(13) 
Under convexity and compactness assumptions, the existence of solutions for this 
problem can be proved by the Maximum Theorem. These solutions are correspon-
dences denoted by (x:, B;) that depends on the market prices (p, q). Furthermore, 
under strong convexity, such solutions are functions. 
7.5 The economy 
In this section we define a multiperiod GEl economy and extend the assumptions 
on the characteristics of this economy under which the GEl model works. 
Consider the product space of economy's commodities 
I J 
rb = IT (Xi X Z) x IT (Yj x Z) 
i=l j=l 
and the sets 
.6.+ 
An economy can thus be described by a set 
whose elements satisfy the conditions: 
H.Ml. The ith consumer's consumption set Xi C IRL* is closed and Wi E Xi' 
H.M2. The utility function Ui (.) that represents the ith consumer's preference 
relation C:i is continuous in Xi. 
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H.M3. Xi is convex, Vi = 1, ... , I. 
H.M4. Ui (.) is concave in Xi, Vi = 1, ... , I. 
H.M5. The utility function Ui (.) is monotonous in Xi' 
H.M6. Survival assumption: For every consumer, there exists ;£i E Xi such that 
;£i « Wi· 
H.M7. The production set for the j - th firm, Y j C IRL*, is closed, bounded and 
o E Y j . 
H.MS. The objective function for the j - th firm OJ : Y j X Z X IRL* X IRc ---+ IR is 
continuous. 
H.M9. Y j is convex, Vj = 1, ... , 1. 
H.MIO. For each firm j E {1, ... , J}, the function OJ (.) is concave in Y j x Z, 
V (p, q) E IRL* X IRc . 
H.Ml1. For each firm j E {1, ... , J}, the function OJ (-) is homogeneous of degree 
a in P and q, for some a > O. 
H.M12. The set of feasible financial assets Z C IRc is closed and 0 E Z. 
H.M13. Z c IRc is convex. 
H.M14. The return functions ACG,F) (p, q): VG>- Fare nonnegative, continuous, 
and homogeneous of degree zero in (p, q) . 
H.M15. Financial asset survival assumption: :3z E Z : ACG,F) (p, q) z » O. 
H.M16. The set of allocations A is nonempty, closed, and bounded. 
H.M17. For each (p, q) E 6+, the set 
IF(p,q)= {(x,B) EI1 (Xi x Z): :3(y,~) E (y(p,q),~(p,q)), ((x,B),(y,~)) EA, 
PF . XiF + qF . BiF ~ PF . WiF + Pr L ACF,G)' BiG, 'liFE 8' \ {Fo U FT}, Vi 
G-<F 
PF' XiF ~ PF' WiF + Pr L ACF,G)' BiG, VF E FT, Vi} 
G-<F 
J __ J __ 
is nonempty, where y (p, q) = L Yj (p, q) and ~ (p, q) = L ~j (p, q) defined as 
j=l j=l 
arg max {OJ (Yj, ~j'P' q): PFo' YjFo + qFo . ~jFo = 0, 
PF . YjF - Pr L ACF,G)~jG + qF . ~jF = 0, 'liFE 8' \ {Fo U FT} , 
G-<F 
PF . YjF - PF . LG-<F ACF,G)~jG = 0, VF EFT, 
Yj E Y j , ~i E Z}. 
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H.M18. All relevant information is symmetric across economic agents, given by 
the informational structure {Fd;=o, finitely generated by Ft = {Fn;:l' Vt = 
0, ... , T, and summarized by ~. 
7.6 The concept of a sequential equilibrium 
We now introduce the concept of a sequential equilibrium. 
Definition 16 Sequential Equilibrium. The vector prices (p*, q*) E IRL* X IRc, 
with (p*, q*) i= 0, and the consumers' and producers' allocations ((x*, 0*) , (y*, C)) E 
r b is a sequential equilibrium for an economy E, if 
FP Each firm solves its decision Problem (12); 
CP Each consumer solves its decision Problem (13); 
MC Market clearing: 
I I J 
LX:=LWi+Lyj, (14) 
i=l i=l j=l i=l j=l 
7.7 Existence, characterization and local uniqueness of se-
quential equilibria 
The previous result on the existence, characterization and local uniqueness of a GEl 
equilibrium can be extended accordingly to the multiperiods model. 
Theorem 17 Existence of a sequential equilibrium. Let E be an economy 
satisfying conditions (H.M1) to (H.M18). Then there exists a sequential equilibrium 
((x*,O*), (y*,C) ,p*,q*) E rb x IR~* x IRc . 
Proof. 
The proof is similar to that of Theorem considering the following mathematical 
programming problem, instead of Problem (3) of Theorem 3: 
Let (Yj (p, q) , ~j (p, q)) the solutions of the j - th firms' problem for all j = 
1, ... , J. 
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Now, consider (p, q) E .6.+, (y,~) E Y and 0 E A such that define the following 
problem, 
I 
M ax 2: Di Ui (Xi) 
s.a i=1 
I I J 
2: XiFo ~2: WiFo + 2:j =1 YjFo, 
i=1 i=1 
I J I J I 2: XiF+ 2: A(F,G)~jF ~2: WiF + 2:j =1 YjF+ 2: A(F,G)6liF , \:;IF E ~ \lFo} , 
i=1 j=1 i=1 i=1 
I J 
2: 6liF =2: ~jF' \:;IF E~, 
i=1 j=1 
PF·XiF+qF·6liF~PF·WiF+PF" 2: A(F,G)·6liG,\:;IFE~\{FoUFT}' 
G-<F 
PF . XiF ~ PF . WiF + PF· 2: A(F,G)· 6liG , V F EFT, 
G-<F 
I 
(x, z) E TI (Xi X /Z). 
i-I 
The rest of proof is identical to that of Theorem 3 . 
• 
(15) 
We can also prove the existence of a GEl equilibrium with spot prices p* =1= o. The 
proof is similar to that of Theorem 17 considering the following equality constraints 
I I 
2: XiFo = 2: WiFo + 2::=1 YjFo , 
i=1 i=1 
I J I J I 
2: XiF+ 2: A(F,G)~jF = 2: WiF + 2: j =1 YjF+ 2: A(F,G)6liF , V F E ~ \ {Fo} , 
i=1 j=1 i=1 i=1 
instead of inequalities in Problem (15) of Theorem 17. 
Analogously, we can establish sufficient conditions for the characterization of a 
local sequential equilibrium under differentiability assumptions. These conditions 
are the first order conditions of Problem (15) and the fixed-point conditions required 
by Theorem 17. 
Finally, the local uniqueness of a local sequential equilibrium can be proved using 
these sufficient conditions. 
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